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Federal Credit Union Share Drafts: Will Congress 
Default? 
Economic adversity spawned the concept of cooperative con- 
sumer credit and the credit union institution as it is known in 
America today. Cooperative credit had its modern origin in Ger- 
many in the mid-1800's' and was brought to America in the early 
1900's as a means of relieving those of modest means, with little 
access to credit, from paying usurious interest rates to loan 
sharks? The first credit union in the United States was organized 
in Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1909.Wuring that same year 
the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the first credit union law 
in this ~ o u n t r y . ~  
Throughout the early 1900's the American credit union 
movement proliferated so that by the early 1930's the concept 
came to the attention of federal legislators. On June 26, 1934, 
Congress enacted the Federal Credit Union Act .Wo less than 
forty-one states had already passed legislation allowing for the 
state charter of credit unions! A dual chartering system was thus 
established7 that  closely resembles the chartering system for 
banks and other financial institutions in this country. 
1. CREDIT UNIONS 1 (S. Feldman ed. 1974); J. MOODY & G. FITE, THE CREDIT UNION 
MOVEMENT 5 (1971). See generally R. BERGENGREN, COOPERATIVE BANKING 46-47 (1923). 
2. J. MOODY & G. RTE, THE CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT 9 (1971). See also R. BERGEN- 
GREN, COOPERATIVE BANKING 2-3 (1923); CREDIT UNIONS 2 (S. Feldman ed. 1974); J. CRO- 
TEAU, THE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 1 (1956); J. DUBLIN, CREDIT UNIONS 132-34 (2d ed. 1971). 
3. R. BERGENGREN, COOPERATIVE BANKING 53 (1923). The first credit union in the 
United States, La Caisse Populaire Ste. Marie (St. Mary's Bank), is currently operating 
under its original New Hampshire state charter which "was authorized by Special Act of 
the New Hampshire Legislature in 1909." Id. 
4. 1909 Mass. Acts ch. 419 (codified a t  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 171 (West 1971)). 
5. Federal Credit Union Act, ch. 750, 15 1, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934) (current version at 12 
U.S.C. 015 1751-1790 (1976), as amended by Federal Credit Union Act Amendments of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, 0f  302-310, 91 Stat. 49). 
6. J. DUBLIN, CREDIT UNIONS 149 (2d ed. 1971). Mr. Dublin further points out that by 
1934 
[olver 3,000 credit unions were operating among all kinds of groups, and mass- 
production techniques had been perfected. . . . And finally in a memorable 5- 
day meeting at Estes Park, Colorado, 52 credit union leaders from 22 states held 
a constitutional convention to form a national union. On August 10, 1934, they 
signed the constitution and bylaws of the Credit Union National Association. 
Id. Today only Alaska, Delaware, South Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia 
are without state credit union legislation. These states have only federal credit unions. 
7. Under a dual chartering system a financial institution may be chartered by either 
the federal government or a state government. 
937 
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As credit unions have grown in number they have broadened 
the scope of their financial services. This trend has been met with 
increasing antagonism and opposition by the banking world. Con- 
sistent with this opposition, the American Bankers Association in 
1977 filed suit against the Administrator of the National Credit 
Union Administration seeking to prevent credit unions from using 
share drafts, a third-party payment device similar to a bank 
check? This Comment will explore the creation and purpose of 
federal credit unions in order to examine the controversy concern- 
ing the credit union share draft. After some conclusions are 
reached regarding the legal and policy arguments surrounding 
share drafts and other methods of third-party payment, the Com- 
ment will make some basic recommendations designed to alle- 
viate the pressure mounting between institutional members of 
the financial community as a result of third-party payment de- 
vices. 
II. FEDERALLY CHARTERED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The federally chartered financial world consists of three 
basic types of institutions, each regulated by at  least one govern- 
ment agency. This general grouping consists of commercial 
banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. 
A. Commercial Banks and Savings and Loan Associations 
The commercial bank system makes up the largest network 
of American financial  institution^.^ Commercial banks, like 
credit unions and savings and loan associations, can be chartered 
by either the federal or state governments. The Federal Reserve 
Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation control the 
activities of federally chartered commercial banks and state- 
chartered institutions that choose to become members of the Fed- 
eral Reserve System. Commercial banks are also supervised by 
the Comptroller of the Currency within the Department of the 
Treasurylo due to their close relationship with the money market 
in the United States. Perhaps because they are the oldest finan- 
cial institution in America-and the most closely linked with 
8. This third-party payment device is utilized by credit union members to make 
payments out of their interest-bearing share (savings) accounts. 
9. At the close of 1975, commercial banks in the United States reported total assets 
of $958 billion. Savings and loans and credit unions reported assets-of $330 and $38.3 
billion respectively. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,  POCK^ DATA 
BOOK 345-46 (1976). 
10. 12 U.S.C. $ 1 (1976). 
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American monetary policy-they are also the most heavily regu- 
lated. 
Savings and loan associations also operate on both the fed- 
eral and state level. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board regu- 
lates the activities of federally chartered savings and loans and 
state-chartered institutions tha t  are members of the Federal 
Home Loan Bank system. The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933" 
is the federal legislation applying to federally chartered savings 
and loans. As their regulatory agency's name implies, these or- 
ganizations operate primarily for the purpose of providing loans 
in the mortgage market. 
B. Credit Unions 
In drafting the Federal Credit Union Act its authors drew 
upon what they judged to be the best of the state credit union 
statutes then in existence. An examination of the House debates 
over this piece of legislation reveals that the federal credit union, 
similar to its state-chartered counterpart, was intended to supply 
consumer credit to people of modest means who had been unable 
to obtain small, short term loans from state-chartered or federally 
chartered banks? The poor had been forced to turn to loan sharks 
for their short term credit needs, resulting in the payment of over 
two billion dollars annually in interest on usurious 1oans.V'he 
Federal Credit Union Act therefore provides for the establish- 
ment of cooperative lending institutions operated on a volunteer 
basis by individuals who are united by an occupational, residen- 
tial, or associational bond (generally called the common bond 
requirement). The term "credit union" is defined by the federal 
law as "a cooperative association organized . . . for the purpose 
of promoting thrift among its members and creating a source of 
11. Id. 4 4  1461-1470. 
12. From an economic standpoint i t  is easy to see why banks were generally unwilling 
to make small, short term loans. Banks could keep their funds loaned out to commercial 
customers who borrowed much more than small consumers. Making a few large loans 
carried a much lower administrative cost than making many small ones. This was espe- 
cially true during the computerless age of the early 1900's when accounting and bookkeep- 
ing were much more time consuming and expensive than today. The need credit unions 
filled during this period in history has been described as follows: 
The credit union is based on the theory that the banking system needs 
supplementing by the development of a plan which will specialize in the small- 
est individual units of saving and, a t  the same time, concern itself with problems 
of small credit, collectively of great importance, but individually so small that 
existing banking facilities cannot cope with them except a t  substantial loss. 
R. BERGENGREN, COOPERATIVE BANKING 53 (1923). 
13. 78 CONG. REC. 12223 (1934). 
940 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I978 
credit for provident or productive purposes."14 The Act also enu- 
merates the powers of federally chartered credit unions.l5 
I .  Powers and supervision 
By express statutory authorization a federal credit union 
may, inter alia, make contracts,l9nake loans to members,17 re- 
ceive payments on shares from members,lR pay dividends on 
shares,I9 invest its funds in a number of ways,20 and, most impor- 
tantly, "exercise such incidental powers as shall be necessary or 
requisite to enable it to carry on effectively the business for which 
it is in~orporated."~~ In 1959 the Federal Credit Union Act was 
amended to place the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions within the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.22 This Bureau 
served as the regulatory body responsible for the operation of the 
federal credit union program until 1970. In that year Congress 
placed the program under the auspices of an independent agency, 
the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) .23 This 
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1752(1) (1976). 
15. Id. $ 1757, as amended by Federal Credit Union Act Amendment of 1977, Pub. 
L. No. 95-22, tit. 111, 55 302-303, 91 Stat. 49. 
16. Id. 0 1757(1). 
17. Id. § 1757(5). 
18. Id. 1757(6). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 8 1757(7). 
21. Id. 4 1757(15). Although the incidental powers provision of the Federal Credit 
Union Act has been relied upon by federal credit unions rather heavily, the original 
enabling legislation of 1933 has undergone some very important power-broadening revi- 
sions, thus providing federal credit unions with expanded express powers. A chronological 
sampling of such amendments includes the following: Act of Oct. 25, 1949, ch. 713, Ej 1, 
63 Stat. 890 (current version at 12 U.S.C. # 1757(5) (1976)) (increased from two years to 
three years the limit for loan maturity); Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-354, # 1, 73 
Stat. 630 (current version at 12 U.S.C. Q 1757(5) (1976)) (inter alia, increased loan rnatu- 
rity from three years to five years, authorized loan approval by loan officers, and broad- 
ened investment powers); Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-353, § 1, 78 Stat. 269 
(codified a t  12 U.S.C. 4 1747(7) (1976)) (broadened investment powers); Act of Oct. 19, 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468, 8 10, 84 Stat. 1017 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1757(6) (1976)) 
(allowed federal credit unions to issue share cretificates); Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-318, tit. I, § 133(c)(4), 86 Stat. 235, 270 (current version at 12 U.S.C. 4 1757 (7) 
(1976)) (inter alicr, provides federal credit unions with student loan privileges). 
22. Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-354, 8 3,73 Stat. 628 (current version at 12 
U.S.C. § 1752a(a) (1976)). Prior to 1959 the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions was regulated 
by the Farm Credit Administration within the Department of Agriculture. Act of June 
29, 1948, ch. 711, § 2, 62 Stat. 1092 (current version at 12 U.S.C. 4 1752a (1976)). This 
original placement resulted because "those who were interested in framing the bill thought 
the best place to put it was under the Farm Credit Administration for the reason that that 
branch of the Government is the most experienced branch in the matter of cooperative 
credit." 78 CONG. REC. 12224 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Steagall). 
23. 12 U.S.C. 4 1752a (1976). 
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agency is headed by an administrator who serves by appointment 
of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen- 
ate? 
2. Organization 
Any seven or more natural persons are eligible to apply for a 
credit union charter.25 Applications for a charter are evaluated by 
the NCUA based upon criteria enumerated in the Federal Credit 
Union Act. Among these criteria are the economic advisability of 
establishing the proposed corporation and the common bond re- 
quirement .26 
Federal credit unions are democratically controlled and gov- 
erned by an unpaid board of directors duly elected from among 
the general credit union membership? The loan activities of the 
corporation are controlled by a credit c ~ m m i t t e e , ~ ~  while a super- 
visory committee oversees other internal administrative poli- 
c i e s ~ ~ ~  These committees are composed of unpaid volunteers ap- 
pointed by the board of directors from among the general mem- 
bership. 
The treasurer, who in most cases serves as a full-time man- 
ager of the credit union, is the only executive officer of the organi- 
zation allowed compensation for his services. The Federal Credit 
Union Act also provides for the credit committee to delegate its 
loan approval authority to one or more loan officers who are also 
compensated for their services.30 Under the incidental powers pro- 
vision of this Act,31 federal credit unions have found no difficulty 
in staffing other full-time, compensated positions for loan, collec- 
tion, admistrative, and accounting departments. 
The American credit union movement has experienced tre- 
mendous growth since its inception. As credit unions have grown 
to command larger portions of the financial services market, 
amendments to their enabling legislation have made some of 
thier unique characteristics less apparent, making them appear 
increasingly similar to other types of lending institutions. There 
24. Id. 4 1752a(b). 
25. Id. !j 1753. 
26. The Federal Credit Union Act limits credit union membership to "groups having 
a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighbor- 
hood, community, or rural district." Id. 6 1759. 
27. Id. !j 1761. 
28. Id. 4 1761c, as amended by Federal Credit Union Act Amendment of 1977, Pub. 
L. No. 95-22, tit. III, # 304, 91 Stat. 51. 
29. 12 U.S.C. 4 1761d (1976). 
30. Id. !j 1761a. 
31. Id. !j 1757(15). 
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remain, however, some fundamental distinctions between credit 
unions and other types of lending institutions. An understanding 
of the differences that affect third-party payment systems and 
grant competitive advantages to one institution over another is 
essential to the analysis in this Comment. 
C. DistinctionsAffecting Competition 
Among Financial Institutions 
State and federal law requires commercial banks and savings 
and loan institutions to pay income tax. By contrast, credit un- 
ions enjoy an income tax exemption on both the federal and state 
levels. Taxing authorities justify this favorable status by noting 
that credit unions maintain no capital stock.32 
The amount of interest payable by commercial banks is cur- 
rently limited to 5% per annum on passbook savings," while sav- 
ings and loan associations are allowed to pay 5.25% on similar 
 account^.^' This interest differential represents an attempt to 
draw a higher percentage of the savings dollar into the mortgage 
market through savings and loan associations. Credit unions op- 
erate under no interest payment ceiling; the amount of dividends 
paid is governed by individual boards of  director^.^^ As a result, 
credit unions generally pay a higher return on share deposits than 
do banks or savings and loan associations on savings  account^.^" 
This of course serves as an important incentive for saving in 
credit union share accounts rather than in savings accounts pro- 
vided by banks and savings and loans. 
The competitive advantages given credit unions are tem- 
pered somewhat by other relative disadvantages. Credit union 
services are only available to credit union members, who must 
meet the "common bond" r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ~ ~  This effectively limits 
loan and savings portfolios to natural persons, thus restricting 
32. See, e.g., I.R.C. !j 501(c)(14)(A); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 7-9-25 (1953). 
33. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. 5 217.7(c) (1978). 
34. 12 C.F.R. !j 526.3 (1978). 
35. 12 U.S.C. 8 1763 (1976), as amended by Federal Credit Union Act Amendment 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, tit. 111, 5 301, 91 Stat. 53. 
36. For the quarter ending Dec. 31, 1978, the Federal Employees Credit Union (the 
largest state-chartered credit union in Utah) paid share dividends at the rate of 7.11% per 
annum. Telephone interview with James J. Dawson, Treasurer and General Manager of 
the Federal Employees Credit Union, Ogden, Utah (Jan. 12, 1979). For that same quarter 
the Navy Federal Credit Union (the largest federally chartered credit union in the United 
States) paid on its share accounts 7% per annum. Telephone interview with John Hender- 
son, Director of Education and Information, Navy Federal Credit Union, Washington, 
D.C. (Jan. 12, 1979). 
37. 12 U.S.C. 8 1759 (1976). 
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credit union ability to compete with other financial institutions 
for the business dollar. In addition, credit unions, as well as sav- 
ings and loan institutions, are not expressly authorized to offer 
demand deposit service." Commercial banks that are members of 
the Federal Reserve System are the only group of financial insti- 
tutions with direct access to a national check-clearing facility; 
they have therefore traditionally enjoyed a monopoly in the area 
of third-party payment accounts. Since banks are prohibited by 
federal law from directly or indirectly paying interest on demand 
deposits,J9 these accounts, although subject to a reserve require- 
ment,+epresent free money to commercial banks. After meeting 
the reserve requirements, banks can lend out demand deposit 
money and thus realize a much higher return than if they were 
to pay interest on these accounts. 
Credit unions and savings and loan institutions share at least 
one common advantage over commercial banks in that banks are 
required to maintain reserves against total deposits. Depending 
upon a bank's geographic location, this requirement may range 
from seven to twenty-two percent of its total demand deposits 
(checking account balances), and from three to ten percent of its 
savings  deposit^.^' Credit unions and savings and loan institu- 
tions, however, are not required to maintain any reserves against 
their share deposits or savings accounts. Consequently, credit 
unions and savings and loan institutions can loan from three to 
twenty-eight percent4' more of the funds on deposit than can 
commercial banks. This advantage is partially offset by the fact 
that banks can offer demand deposit services. These basic differ- 
ences among American financial organizations shed light upon 
the disputes presently surrounding third-party payment devices. 
Prior to 1974 federal credit union members could make share 
account withdrawals in person, by phone, or by mailed request. 
On August 21, 1974, the Administrator of the NCUA published a 
38. A demand account with a commercial bank is merely a traditional checking 
account. Money deposited in these accounts is not subject to a notice of withdrawal, but 
is payable on demand. 
39. 12 U.S.C. 8 371a (1976). 
40. Id. 4 461. 
41. Id. 
42. One hundred dollars (representing the loanable funds, from a $100 deposit, avail- 
able to credit unions or savings and loan institutions not subject to a reserve requirement) 
is 2890 greater than $78 (representing the loanable funds from a similar $100 deposit with 
a commercial bank that is subject to a 22% reserve requirement). 
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regulation permitting interested parties to submit recommenda- 
tions for pilot programs relating to electronic funds transfer sys- 
tems? As a result of the recommendations received, the NCUA 
approved a pilot plan allowing credit unions to offer third-party 
payment services in the form of share drafts.44 
The approved share draft system was designed to provide 
credit union members with an alternative method of share with- 
drawal. As defined by the NCUA, a share draft is 
a negotiable or non-negotiable instrument which directs a Fed- 
eral credit union to withdraw funds from a member's share draft 
account and pay those funds to either the member or a third 
party designated by the member. A share draft is payable 
through a bank and is similar to other forms of payable through 
drafts drawn against other nonbank institutions such as money 
order companies and insurance ~ompanies.~" 
A share draft therefore has essentially the same function as a 
commercial bank check. It provides credit union members with 
a system of third-party payment from deposited funds. 
Although a share draft looks and works much like a commer- 
cial bank check, some very important technical differences exist. 
Since a share draft is paid out of a member's share account," any 
money on deposit is subject to dividend payments.47 The demand 
deposit accounts from which commercial bank checks are paid, 
however, do not bear interest. The Federal Credit Union Stan- 
dard Bylaws provide that a sixty-day notice of withdrawal power 
be retained by credit unions upon share accounts.4R As long as 
credit unions maintain this notice requirement, even though it is 
not generally exercised, the account cannot technically be classi- 
fied as a demand account.49 
43. 12 C.F.R. 9 721.3 (1978). 
44. The experimental share draft programs were approved by the NCUA on Oct. 1, 
1974. 42 Fed. Reg. 11,247 (1977). 
45. Id. 
46. A credit union share account is the equivalent of a passbook savings account a t  
a commercial bank. Technically, however, a credit union member is buying shares in a 
mutual organization at the rate of five dollars per share (par value) when he deposits his 
money. 
47. Dividend payments on share accounts are the equivalent of interest on passbook 
savings accounts with other financial institutions. Dividend payments from credit unions 
do not qualify for the $100 federal income tax exclusion available to taxpayers receiving 
dividends from corporations. I.R.C. 9 116(b)(l). 
48. Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws art. III, 9 5(a). All federally chartered 
credit unions must adopt the Standard Federal Credit Union Bylaws unless otherwise 
approved by the NCUA. 12 U.S.C. 9 1758 (1976). 
49. A "demand deposit" is defined as "every deposit which is not a 'time.deposit' or 
'savings deposit.' " 12 C.F.R. 9 217.l(a) (1978). This definition limits demand deposits 
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Share drafts are payable through a commercial bank, thus 
permitting credit union access to the national clearing facility 
operated by the Federal Reserve System. The credit union upon 
which the bank makes presentment of the draft may dishonor it 
for a number of reasons, including insufficient funds in the mem- 
ber's share account, exercise of the sixty-day notice requirement, 
or a stop payment order made by the issuer of the draft. 
By February 1, 1977, the Administrator of the NCUA re- 
ported that 4.6%, or a total of 585 federal credit unions were 
operating some form of share draft program." His report indi- 
cated that during the quarter ending December 31,1976, approxi- 
mately 3,642,408 drafts totaling $199,272,045 had been cleared 
through banks.51 
IV. SHARE DRAFT LEGALITY 
On September 7, 1976, as the pilot share draft programs were 
rapidly growing in number, the American Bankers Association 
filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia against the Administrator of the NCUA.52 The suit 
challenged both the Administrator's authority to establish pilot 
share draft programs and the legality of the share draft program 
itself under the Federal Credit Union Act.13 The complaint was 
dismissed without prejudice when the Administrator agreed to 
issue a final regulation concerning share drafts." On February 28, 
1977, the Administrator published a proposed share draft regula- 
tion." Following a hearing on the proposal, the final regulation 
with amendments was published to be effective as of February 6, 
1978.56 On December 9, 1977, the day following the official pro- 
nouncement of the final share draft regulation, the American 
Bankers Association refiled its suit against Lawrence B. Connell, 
Jr., Administrator of the NCUA.57 
- - - - 
to any deposit that does not require a notice of withdrawal to be given to the bank holding 
the deposited funds. See id. § 217.la(b)-(d), (e)(2). 
50. 42 Fed. Reg. 11,247 (1977). 
51. Id. 
52. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment and Mandamus, Ameri- 
can Bankers Ass'n v. Montgomery, No. 76-1661 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 1976). 
53. Id. a t  4. 
54. Order, American Bankers Ass'n v. Montgomery, No. 76-1661 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 
1977). 
55. 42 Fed. Reg. 11,248-49 (1977) (codified with modifications a t  12 C.F.R. § 761.34 
(1978)). 
56. 42 Fed. Reg. 61,977 (1977). 
57. American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 447 F. Supp. 296, 298 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal 
docketed, No. 78-1337 (D.C. Cir. May 2, 1978). 
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The court in American Bankers Association v.  ConnelFn con- 
sidered two issues. The first was "whether, consistent with the 
terms of the FCU [Federal Credit Union] Act and the general 
statutory scheme controlling federal financial institutions, the 
NCUA can authorize FCUs to utilize share drafts as a means of 
accessing members'  account^."^@ The second issue concerned 
"whether the manner in which NCUA promulgated its regulation 
comports with the standards of the Administrative Procedure 
Act."60 After a review of the arguments for both questions the 
court ruled that "no genuine issues of material fact" existed and 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgmente61 
The court summarily treated the second issue in American 
Bankers by relying upon- guidelines established in the Adminis- 
trative Procedure Act. The Act provides that courts may only set 
aside an administrative agency's action if it is found to be 
"[alrbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law."62 The court held that the NCUA's au- 
thorization of a share draft program did not violate this standard. 
A. Lack of Express Statutory Authority for Share Draft 
Programs in the Federal Credit Union Act 
The court in American Bankers directed the bulk of its anal- 
ysis toward considering whether the lack of express statutory au- 
thority was fatal to the operation of share draft programs. Be- 
cause the Federal Credit Union Act does not expressly authorize 
share account withdrawals, the court reasoned the authorization 
must derive from the incidental powers provision of the Act and 
therefore the mechanics for withdrawal should be left to the dis- 
cretion of the NCUA.63 The court pointed out that an administra- 
tive agency's interpretation of its enabling legislation should be 
upheld if it has a reasonable basis in law and is not "plainly 
erroneous."" Further, it  is not required that a program be 
"necessary" to the continued existence of an agency in order for 
the program to be authorized under the incidental powers provi- 
sion of that agency's enabling act? 
58. 447 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1337 (D.C. Cir. May 2, 
1978). 
59. Id. at 298. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 297. 
62. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). 
63. 447 F. Supp. at 298. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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In defining the parameters of a federal agency's interpreta- 
tion of its enabling law, the court relied upon Arnold Tours u. 
Camp," the leading decision treating the scope of an agency's 
incidental powers clause. In Arnold Tours, a travel agency 
brought an action against the Comptroller of the Currency seek- 
ing declaratory and injunctive relief from an adminstrative ruling 
that permitted national banks to engage in the travel agency 
business by virtue of their incidental powers. The plaintiff argued 
that an agency's incidental powers only authorize activities that 
are necessary to allow that agency to perform its intended pur- 
pose, and that "necessary" should be interpreted as meaning 
indispensable. The court held that the term "necessary" does not 
mean that which is indispensable, but that if a "connection be- 
tween an incidental activity and an express power does not exist, 
the activity is not authorized as an incidental power."" The court 
struck down the Comptroller's ruling on the grounds that it could 
find no logical connection between an expressly authorized bank- 
ing function and the operation of a full-scale travel agency busi- 
n e ~ s . ~ ~  
The court in American Bankers pointed out that it did not 
find share draft programs inconsistent with the Federal Credit 
Union Act or the general legislative scheme surrounding federal 
credit unions. Share drafts were considered merely a "variation 
on established methods of accessing members  account^."^^ Rely- 
ing upon a form of the reenactment doctrine,70 the court found 
that congressional silence concerning the programs could well be 
interpreted as "an implied ratification . . . of NCUA's approval 
of FCU share drafts."71 By contrast, however, the court recog- 
nized the fact that Congress has declined passing measures that 
would have expressly given federal credit unions the authority to 
implement third-party systems.72 Aware of the dichotomy pre- 
sented above, the court simply declared share draft programs 
legal by virtue of the incidental powers provision of the Federal 
Credit Union Act, and deferred to Congress the policy considera- 
66. 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972). 
67. Id. at 432. 
68. Id. at 438. 
69. 447 F. Supp. at 299. 
70. The theory of the reenactment doctrine was stated as follows by the Supreme 
Court: "[Tlhe reenactment by Congress, without change, of a statute, which had pre- 
viously received long continued executive construction, is an adoption by Congress of such 
construction." United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337,339 (1908) 
(citing United States v. Falk, 204 U S .  143, 152 (1907)). 
71. 447 F. Supp. at 300. 
72. Id. 
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tions surrounding any possible proscription of the share draft 
programs.73 The American Bankers case is currently on appeal to 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir~uit. '~ 
B. State Action 
Although American Bankers represents the first judicial 
treatment of the legality of share draft programs on the federal 
level, state courts have faced a similar problem with respect to 
their own credit union laws. In Florida Bankers Association v. 
Leon County Teachers Credit U n i ~ n , ' ~  a Florida district court of 
appeals also held share drafts legal under that state's enabling 
legislation. The Florida law is quite similar to the Federal Credit 
Union Act, and the incidental powers provisions contained within 
them are almost i d e n t i ~ a l . ~ ~  
The court struck down an order of the Florida Department 
of Banking and Finance that had found as a matter of law that 
state credit unions were prohibited from making share account 
withdrawals by means of third-party payment drafts." As in 
American Bankers, the Florida court recognized that the share 
draft program presented complex policy questions of great im- 
portance to credit unions and commercial banks. It likewise re- 
fused to become involved as a judicial entity in such policy 
choices, but instead held share draft programs legal as an appro- 
priate exercise of the credit union's incidental powers. In lan- 
guage echoing a thought set forth in American Bankers, decided 
just two and one-half months earlier, the court stated that 
" '[iln legal effect a share draft is nothing more than another 
method of withdrawal of savings from a credit union by a mem- 
ber, albeit a sophisticated method and one which, by its very 
sophistication, is new to the credit union industry.' "7R 
Credit union share draft programs have not always been 
found legal by state courts. The Iowa Supreme Court on June 28, 
1978 held them to be in violation of state law. In Iowa Credit 
Union League v. Iowa Department of Banking," the league 
73. The court stated, "If Congress eventually acts with regard to share drafts, Con- 
gress then will be making policy judgment. This Court cannot and will not indulge in such 
policy judgments. If accessing FCU members' accounts by means of share drafts is to be 
proscribed, it must be proscribed by the legislature." Id. (footnote omitted). 
74. Appeal docketed, No. 78-1337 (D.C. Cir. May 2, 1978). 
75. 359 So. 2d 886 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
76. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. 8 657.04(8) (West Supp. 1978) with 12 U.S.C. Si 
1757(15) (1976). 
77. 359 So. 2d at 891. 
78. Id. at 889 (quoting an order of the Florida Department of Banking and Finance). 
79. 268 N.W.2d 165 (Iowa 1978). 
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sought judicial review of a decision of the Iowa Superintendant 
to Banking that credit unions not be allowed to operate share 
draft programs. The claim made by the league was similar to the 
claims made by the credit union interests in the American 
Bankers and Florida Bankers cases-that although the Iowa 
credit union enabling legislation did not expressly allow for share 
draft programs they should be found legal under the incidental 
powers provision of Iowa's credit union law. The Iowa court did 
not accept the argument. Instead, it looked past the notice-of- 
withdrawal requirement and declared that "[slhare drafts like 
ordinary checks are demand  instrument^."^^ The court argued 
that share drafts are not just another form of account access 
permitted as an incidental power, but are an entirely new busi- 
ness for credit unions-one that makes share accounts much more 
volatile than the founders of the cooperative credit union move- 
ment Furthermore, the new system brings third per- 
sons directly into the share withdrawal process, a process that has 
previously involved just the member and the credit union. 
The court finally observed that since share drafts are de- 
signed to circulate among the general population, a public inter- 
est in the solvency of credit unions is created.82 If the legislature 
had intended for credit unions to offer "de facto" checking serv- 
ices to their members, it might have protected the public's inter- 
est by implementing safeguards such as reserve requirements on 
credit union deposits.'13 
Although the Iowa court was technically incorrect when it 
characterized a share draft as a demand deposit, the court appar- 
ently recognized that a credit union would rarely exercise its 
notice-of-withdrawal requirement. To do so would decrease pub- 
lic confidence in the share draft system and consequently injure 
the credit unions offering the service. 
The arguments made by the Iowa Supreme Court are very 
compelling. Unlike the American Bankers and Florida Bankers 
courts, the Iowa court stripped away from the share draft any 
artificial distinctions couched in incidental power jargon and ex- 
posed the program as a credit union industry attempt to offer its 
members interest-bearing checking accounts. Regardless of 
whether the court's characterization of share draft accounts ac- 
curately reflects credit union intent, the court raises issues the 
80. Id. at 172. 
81. See id. at 166. 
82. Id. at 172. 
83. Id. 
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other courts did not reach and thus provides a glimpse at  possible 
anit-share-draft judicial analysis. 
C. NOW Accounts 
The controversy surrounding credit union share drafts is not 
the first time in recent history that the judiciary has scrutinized 
third-party payment devices. In the early 1970's some mutual 
savings banks in the New England area introduced the negotiable 
order-of-withdrawal (NOW) account. NOW accounts are identi- 
cal in form to credit union share draft accounts and are therefore 
the functional equivalent of an interest-bearing checking ac- 
count. They operate by means of a pay-through draft and are 
distinguished from demand deposits by a notice-of-withdrawal 
req~irement .~~ Although Congress has not legislated with regard 
to share draft accounts, it has taken affirmative action in dealing 
with NOW accounts. At the time NOW accounts were being im- 
plemented in state-chartered Massachusetts banks, the financial 
institutions subject to federal regulatory control were prohibited 
by the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board from offering negotiable third-party payment privileges on 
interest-bearing accounts.85 
In 1972 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
Consumer Savings Bank v .  Commissioner of Banksx6 declared 
that the state banking commission was incorrect when it ruled 
that a state-chartered savings bank8' could not legally implement 
a NOW account program. Using the same reasoning utilized six 
years later in American Bankers and Florida Bankers, the court 
held that the NOW account is simply another legitimate method 
of allowing bank customers access to savings accounts. The court 
adopted the rationale of a 1968 Maryland state court opinion: " 'If 
. . . a depositor of the Bank, on making a withdrawal, has the 
84. Since institutions offering demand (checking) account services are prohibited 
from paying interest on such accounts, 12 U.S.C. 8 371a (1976) (demand account interest 
prohibition on members of the Federal Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. 6 561.11a (1978) 
(demand account interest prohibition on members of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board), it can be fairly concluded that all accounts that accrue interest are not demand 
accounts and are therefore subject to  a notice-of-withdrawal requirement. 
85. 12 C.F.R. 46 217.5(~)(1), 329.5(~)(4), 545.4-l(a)(l) (1978). 
86. 361 Mass. 717, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972). 
87. Savings banks are mutually owned institutions located primarily in the North- 
east. They are similar to credit unions in that they are nonprofit organizations owned by 
depositors. Savings banks, however, differ from credit unions because they are governed 
by a self-perpetuating board of trustees and the depositor-owners have no voting rights. 
Mutual savings banks are not chartered on the federal level. See generally G. MUNN, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND RNANCE 821 (7th ed. 1973). 
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option of requesting cash, or a treasurer's check, or of purchasing 
a money order. . . according him a fourth option of drawing a 
check on his own account . . . is a distinction without a differ- 
ence.' "IM 
The Consumers Savings Bank decision spurred two com- 
pletely divergent pieces of legislation in Congress. The first pro- 
posal would have prohibited NOW accounts nationwide, while 
the second would have authorized them on the same scale? In 
the spirit of compromise, the Legislature authorized NOW ac- 
counts on an experimental basis in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire." This law was later amended to expand the NOW 
program to four other New England states." Congress rather care- 
fully observed the impact of the NOW account in its experimen- 
tal setting in its early years,92 but has taken no action to broaden 
or restrict the NOW experimental area of six states. 
Due to the similarity between NOW accounts and credit 
union share draft programs, the NOW account controversy, 
which preceded share draft litigation by several years, could have 
established some rules by which the legality of share drafts could 
be evaluated. Unfortunately, the NOW legislation has created 
ambiguity rather than clarity. 
The law establishing the NOW program conspicuously fails 
to include credit unions in its definition of "depository institu- 
t i o n ~ . " ~ ~  Parties for both sides in the American Bankers case 
viewed this fact as supporting their respective arguments. The 
American Bankers Association adopted the position that this 
deletion is indicative of congressional intent to forbid federal 
credit unions from using third-party payment devices." On the 
other hand the Administrator of the NCUA argued that the dele- 
tion is an implied congressional approval of the program? 
88. 361 Mass. a t  719,282 N.E.2d a t  417 (quoting Savings Bank v. Bank Comm'r, 248 
Md. 461, 475, 237 A.2d 45, 53 (1968)). 
89. S. REP. NO. 149, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. News 2014, 2015. 
90. Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100, 8 2, 87 Stat. 342 (current version at 12 
U.S.C. 6 1832 (1976)). 
91. Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, 82,90 Stat. 197 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
Ji 1832(a) (1976)) (NOW accounts can now be offered by federally chatered institutions 
in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire). 
92. See genemlly Assessment of the Impact of NOW Accounts in Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire: Hearing on the NOW Account Experiment in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Bank- 
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
93. See 12 U.S.C. 8 1832(b) (1976). 
94. Brief for Appellant at 19-20, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 447 F. Supp. 
296 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1337 (D.C. Cir. May 2, 1978). 
95. Brief for Appellee at 44, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 447 F. Supp. 296 
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The legal issues surrounding federal share draft programs 
remain unsettled. The only federal court to directly address the 
subject found share drafts legal, but that decision may be re- 
versed on appeal. The two state supreme courts that have ruled 
on state programs closely resembling the federal government's 
have reached opposite conclusions. But, although it could be an 
overstatement to maintain that federal credit union share drafts 
are legal, it would be fair to say the pendulum is swinging in that 
direction. 
Rather than allow continued judicial development of the law 
in this field on a piecemeal basis, Congress should end the exist- 
ing share draft controversy by taking affirmative measures. In- 
deed, most court opinions dealing with share draft legality recog- 
nize the need for affirmative policymaking action by legislatures 
in order to eliminate the disparity of treatment experienced by 
different financial institutions providing the same service. In 1971 
the President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regula- 
tion (the Hunt Commission), after having completed an extensive 
study of the existing status of American financial institutions, 
stated, "The Commission regards parity of treatment with re- 
spect to taxation, reserve requirements and regulation among in- 
stitutions offering third party payment and other banking serv- 
ices to the general public as essential."" 
The basic inconsistencies between the enabling legislation of 
the various types of financial institutions could best be resolved 
by beginning anew~with a clean statutory slate and creating insti- 
tutions designed to serve the financial needs of modem businesses 
and consumers. However, since these radical changes could cre- 
ate severe problems during the interim between dissolution of old 
systems and implementation of new ones, a surgical approach to 
the ills of the financial world may best solve these problems. 
Because the separate states provide fifty laboratories in 
which financial innovations can be tested, it would be a mistake 
to eliminate the experimentation conducted under the present 
(D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1337 (D.C. Cir. May 2, 1978). A similar argument 
was made in behalf of the appellee in a brief prepared by the Credit Union National 
Association, Inc., and the National Association of Federal Credit Unions, Inc. Amicus 
Curiae Brief Submitted by Credit Union National Association, Inc. and National Associa- 
tion of Federal Credit Unions, Inc. at 26, American Bankers Ass'n v. Connnell, 447 F. 
Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1337 (D.C. Cir. May 2, 1978). 
96. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION O  FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
REGULATION 57 (1971). 
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dual chartering system. The proposals that follow are therefore 
intentionally limited to the federal credit union share draft sys- 
tem. 
A. Equal Treatment for Similar Services 
Although some important distinctions among types of finan- 
cial institutions should be preserved, Congress should provide 
that offering the same service will result, for purposes of that 
service, in similar legislative treatment. 
1.  Interest Payments 
Commercial banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System are forbidden from paying interest either directly or indi- 
rectly on demand deposit  account^.^' This law was enacted in 
1933 during a severe banking crisis in an attempt to stop the large 
number of small bank failures that was attributed to an inability 
to compete with larger institutions for the demand deposit dollar. 
The 1933 statute sought to remedy this problem by legislatively 
removing what was considered to be competition detrimental to 
the American economy. Although it is now generally believed the 
notion that gave rise to the interest prohibition on demand ac- 
counts was incorrect,gR the law has never been repealed. Of course 
the banking industry has not urged modification of this provision 
since a requirement that interest be paid on demand deposits 
would destroy a source of relatively free money to banking institu- 
tions, The commercial banks' concern over credit union share 
draft accounts is undoubtedly linked to their desire to maintain 
a lucrative monopoly over widely used third-party payment sys- 
tems. This desire is manifested by the fact that the banks, in- 
stead of lobbying for removal of the demand deposit interest pro- 
hibition, challenged the legality of share draft and NOW pro- 
grams. 
Following the banking industry's defeat in American 
Bankers, the Federal Reserve Board removed the competitive dis- 
advantage suffered by its member banks. On May 1, 1978, the 
Board approved an amendment to Regulation Qgg allowing com- 
mercial bank customers to authorize the automatic transfer of 
97. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976). 
98. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 9 (1973). 
99. 12 C.F.R. fj 217 (1978). Regulation Q limits the rates of interest that may be paid 
by member banks of the Federal Reserve System. 
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funds from their savings to their checking  account^.'^ The plan 
became effective on November 1, 1978.1°1 In view of the strong 
arguments made against the legality of credit union share drafts 
by commercial banks, this action seems somewhat ironic. The 
program allows a consenting bank customer to keep his demand 
account balance constant, zero if he so desires, write checks 
against it, and have the bank automatically transfer the amount 
of the check to his non-interest-bearing demand account for final 
payment of the check. While the regulation authorizing the im- 
plementation of this new program was being formulated, it was 
brought to the Board's attention that the proposed program had 
two important weaknesses. First, the new program would allow 
indirect payment of interest on demand deposits. The federal law 
prohibiting commercial banks from paying interest on demand 
accounts states in part, "No member bank shall, directly or indi- 
rectly, by any device whatsoever, pay any interest on any deposit 
which is payable on demand . . . ."Io2 It can be persuasively 
argued that the term "by any device whatsoever" easily includes 
and thus prohibits the program offered by the Board. I t  would, 
in fact, be difficult to conceive of a program that is a clearer 
violation of the indirect payment rule. As early as 1971, the Hunt 
Commission recommended that the interest restriction on com- 
mercial bank demand deposits not be lifted, and observed, 
"Some banks have experimented with devices to transfer funds 
from savings accounts to checking accounts as required when 
checks written by depositors are presented for payment. These 
devices generally have been ruled evasions of the prohibition of 
interest payments on demand deposits."lo3 The Board obliquely 
countered this general argument when it stated that 
the distinction drawn in the Board's regulations between sav- 
ings and demand deposits is that a bank must reserve the right 
to require a t  least 30 days notice prior to withdrawal from a 
savings deposit, while demand deposits are available on de- 
mand. The amendment does not alter this basic distinction, and 
member banks will continue to be required to reserve the right 
to impose at least a 30-day notice period on intended withdraw- 
als of savings deposits . . . . 104 
100. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,002-03 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. 5 217.5(~)(2) to (3)). 
101. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,001 (1978). 
102. 12 U.S.C. 5 371a (1976). 
103. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION O FINANCIAL S T R U ~ R E  AND 
REGULATION 28 ( 1971). 
104. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,001 (1978). 
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The Board here begs the real question of whether the new pro- 
gram violates the indirect payment rule. Perhaps the Board 
should be commended for attempting to bypass an anachronistic 
rule and thereby promote competition for deposits by allowing 
members of the Federal Reserve System to pay interest on de- 
mand deposit accounts. In any event, the Board's argument 
closely resembles the one that the American Bankers Association 
opposed when the Administrator of the NCUA distinguished 
share drafts from checks by use of the notice-of-withdrawal re- 
quirement. Io5 
The second possible weakness of the Board's new regulation 
is that the program allows commercial banks, by a two-step pro- 
cess, to offer NOW accounts. For all practical purposes, a cus- 
tomer is allowed the privilege of writing checks against an 
interest-bearing account. This is precisely the type of transaction 
that Congress in 1975 attempted to limit to six New England 
states through its NOW account legislation. The Board dismissed 
this argument by pointing out that the distinction between sav- 
ings and demand accounts is preserved by its new amendment, 
and that it does not directly allow third-party interest-bearing 
accounts. Io6 
The two issues set forth above were litigated in the Federal 
District Court for the District of Columbia in United States 
League of Savings Associations u. Board of Governors of the Fed- 
eral Reserve System.Io7 The court ruled in favor of the Board of 
Governors on October 31, 1978, and the plaintiff filed a notice of 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir- 
cuit on November 6, 1978.IoR The appellate court has not yet made 
a final ruling. Since Congress has expressly forbidden the pay- 
ment of interest on demand accounts, the court of appeals should 
give deference to that manifested intent and reverse the lower 
court's ruling. Form would be placed above substance by accept- 
ing the argument that the Board of Governor's regulation main- 
tains a distinction between checking and savings accounts and 
only allows interest payments to be made on savings deposits. By 
holding the transfer program illegal as a method of indirectly 
paying interest on demand accounts, the court would place the 
burden of removing the obsolete "no interest on demand depos- 
105. American Bankers Ass'n v. Conneli, 447 F. Supp. at 298. 
106. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,001-02 (1978). 
107. No. 78-0878 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2206 (D.C. Cir. 
Nov. 22, 1978). 
108. United States League of Sav. Assoc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., appeal docketed, No. 78-2206 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 1978). 
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its" rule where it belongs-upon Congress. 
The problems posed by interest payment on third-party pay- 
ment device accounts, whether the interest is paid directly or 
indirectly, are legion. The solution to these problems will involve 
policy choices that should be made by Congress. The demand 
deposit interest restriction should be legislatively removed so that 
banks can fairly compete for third-party payment funds without 
having to resort to backdoor tactics that violate the spirit if not 
the letter of federal law. Should Congress feel that the mainte- 
nance of an interest rate ceiling on third-party payment accounts 
is necessary, it should mandate that Regulation Q be amended 
to provide for such a restriction, and broadened so that all institu- 
tions offering such accounts are subject to the requirement. 
2. Reserve Requirements 
The deposit reserve requirement imposed upon commercial 
banks serves two functions. First, it protects the public, among 
whom checks are circulated, against the temporary or permanent 
inability of banks to pay outstanding demands on checking ac- 
count funds. In short, reserve accounts ensure bank liquidity. 
Second, because demand deposits are considered a part of the 
money supply, commercial banks have the unique ability in the 
financial world to "create" money bjt loaning out demand ac- 
count deposits.lW By raising or lowering member bank reserve 
requirements, the Federal Reserve Board can expand or constrict 
the nation's money supply and thus partially control monetary 
policy. Conceivably, if a large enough quantity of funds shifted 
from demand accounts to interest-bearing third-party payment 
accounts, the Federal Reserve Board's control could be lost or 
impaired. 
If the two purposes of deposit reserves are to be accom- 
plished, credit unions that choose to operate share draft programs 
should be subject to them. Since a share draft is the functional 
109. The United States money supply is defined as  "currency (including coin) and 
demand deposits." M. BURNSTEIN, MONEY 1 (1963). That being true, the phenomenon of 
the commercial banking industry's ability to expand the money supply can best be illus- 
trated as follows: Suppose A has saved $1,000 and deposits it in his checking account at 
hank Z which is subject to a 20% reserve requirement. Bank Z satisfies its reserves with 
$200 and lends $800 to B. B pays C, his creditor, with the borrowed funds and C deposits 
that amount in his checking account at bank Y which is also subject to 20% reserve 
requirement. Bank Y satisfies its reserves with $160 and loans $640 to D who deposits his 
borrowed money in his checking account at bank Y. Assuming this simple fact situation, 
the country's money supply would include A's $1,000 demand account as well as B's $800 
and 11's $640 demand deposits. Therefore, the money supply would have expanded from 
$1,000 to $2,440 as a result of bank lending activities. 
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equivalent of a commercial bank check, the public should be 
afforded the protection of deposit reserves. This being the case, 
each separate financial regulatory agency should not be allowed 
autonomous control over the reserve requirement ratio of the fin- 
ancial institutions it oversees. Permitting each agency complete 
independence in this area could cause the actions of one agency 
to frustrate the monetary policies of the other. Congressional ac- 
tion in this area is therefore necessary to provide the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System with the power in to 
implement an across-the-board deposit reserve requirement. A 
uniform reserve requirement would preserve the Federal Reserve 
Board's control over monetary policy and ensure against institu- 
tional insolvency among all three types of federally chartered 
financial organizations. 
B. Tax Exemption 
Credit unions are exempt from state or federal income tax,Ito 
while savings and loans and commercial banks, though not taxed 
as heavily as most corporations, are required to pay income tax 
on their corporate profits.ltt Tax statutes justify the exemption on 
the basis that credit unions do not maintain capital stock.It2 This 
favorable treatment is also due to the fact that credit unions are 
democratically controlled, subject to a common bond require- 
ment, and created to fill the credit needs of a group of people with 
modest means. 
For the first few years following the enactment of the Federal 
Credit Union Act, credit unions commanded a minuscule portion 
of the financial market.H3 Commercial banks were in fact pleased 
to defer to credit unions the small consumer loans in favor of more 
lucrative short term business loans that credit unions, due to 
their common bond requirement, are unable to attract except on 
a very small scale.Il4 However, during the past few years credit 
110. E . g ,  12 U.S.C. § 1768 (1976); I.R.C. $ 501(c)(14)(A); UTAH CODE ANN. 4 7-9-25 
(1953). 
111. The tax treatment of financial institutions is very complex and beyond the scope 
of this Comment. The taxation provisions are scattered throughout title 12 of the United 
States Code. 
112. E.g., I.R.C. (5 501(c)(14)(A); UTAH CODE ANN. (j 7-9-25 (1953). 
113. By 1940 commercial banks reported total assets of over $64 billion. [I9411 U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 282-83. That same year 
credit unions reported total assets of approximately $252 million. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 
OPERATIONS OP CREDIT UNIONS IN 1940, at 4 (1941). 
114. In order for a business entity to become a credit union member, all of its partners 
or shareholders must satisfy the common bond requirement. For that reason only very 
small corporations and partnerships are allowed credit union privileges. 
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unions have expanded more rapidly than any other form of finan- 
cial institution, at the rate of fifteen to twenty percent per year."" 
Some bankers now believe that credit unions pose a threat of 
becoming their principal competition in the future.l16 In June of 
1977, William Ford, the chief economist for Wells Fargo Bank of 
San Francisco, stated that "[a]s credit unions offer a barrage of 
full financial services, the competition grows wary of the once 
'harmless' thrift movement ."l17 Because credit unions are increas- 
ing in size and services, their favored tax status is more difficult 
to defend against those who claim that credit unions are grad- 
ually assuming traditional banking services. 
The distinction between credit union functions and banking 
activities is becoming unclear, largely due to the exercise by each 
type of institution of its incidental powers. Since Congress and 
the various state legislatures granted credit unions a tax-exempt 
status, those legislatures should therefore now make the final 
determination of what a banking function is and how closely a 
credit union can look and operate like a commercial bank without 
being taxed as one. Once such a policy line is drawn, the share 
draft program may fall on the banking side. If this occurs, credit 
unions who choose to compete directly with taxed financial insti- 
tutions by offering share draft services should expect to pay their 
portion of the income tax burden. 
Should Congress recognize the need for such a policy, at least 
two options would be available. First, if a credit union should 
choose to provide banking or savings and loan association services 
to its members, it could be required to qualify for an appropriate 
state or federal charter. This would mean that such an institution 
would lose its credit union identity and thus its privileged tax 
status.11x This policy would help eliminate the artificial distinc- 
115. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CONSUMER QUESTIONS ON BANKING, SAVING AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATIONS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS 24 (1973). At the close of 1977 federally insured state 
credit unions reported a 20.2% growth in assets over the previous year. For that same time 
period federally insured federal credit unions reported an asset growth of 21.7%. [I9771 
NCUA ANN. REP. 5, 18. 
116. Interview with J. Michael Holt, Senior Vice President and Corporate Secretary 
of Walker Bank and Trust Co., Salt Lake City, Utah (Sept. 10, 1978). 
117. Address by William Ford, Chief Economist of Wells Fargo Bank, San Francisco, 
16th Annual Credit Union Executives Society Conference (June 1977), reprinted in CREDIT 
UNION MAGAZINE, Aug. 1977, a t  8. 
118. In 1973, before the present share draft controversy arose, President Nixon made 
a similar proposal when he authorized the Treasury Department to submit to Congress 
that 
there are credit unions that would prefer to offer the services of "mutual saving 
institutions," such an extension of powers would leave them indistinguishable 
from taxable institutions and their tax-free status could not be justified. 
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tions between agressive credit unions and other financial organi- 
zations and relieve those credit unions that desire to remain 
credit unions from the threat of an industry-wide revocation of 
their tax-exempt status. Thus, clear guidelines as to permissible 
innovations should be promoted. 
Second, should Congress conclude that a complete depriva- 
tion of a credit union's tax-exempt status for offering share draft 
services is not warranted, it could instead impose an income tax 
upon the profits derived from share draft servi~e."~ This may be 
the best and most logical approach in view of the fact that credit 
unions offering share draft services would presumably still pre- 
serve the reasons for their initial blanket tax-exempt status-the 
lack of capital stock, democratic control, the common bond re- 
quirement, and the provision of financial services to those of mod- 
est means. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The credit union has proven to be a viable institution that 
is highly innovative and responsive to the needs of its members. 
The introduction of the share draft program has stirred the atten- 
tion of commercial bankers who have reminded the credit union 
industry that its actions are felt on a competitive basis through- 
out the financial community. 
Recent decisions demonstrate that the legality of credit 
union share draft programs is being favored, thus indicating a 
trend toward homogenization of American financial institutions. 
This homogenization has ripened some policy issues, has called 
into question traditional banking practices, and has caused the 
banking industry to undergo serious introspection regarding its 
established practices. As Congress is pressed to make policy deci- 
sions that will affect the financial community and ultimately the 
American consumer of financial services, it  must determine 
whether some of the distinctions between commercial banks and 
credit unions remain valid or whether they should be legislatively 
Credit unions that want to expand their services and assume the burdens 
of full service mutual thrift institutions will be permitted to do so. Procedures 
to facilitate an exchange of charters will be available. 
US. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, RECOMMENDATIONS F R CHANCE IN THE US.  FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
13 (1973). 
119. This would create a significant administrative and accounting burden upon 
credit unions desiring to operate share draft programs. It would involve a total segregation 
of share draft funds from the time of deposit until paid out or collected with interest by 
member-borrowers. The inconvenience of this procedure, however, may be somewhat 
mitigated for the credit union if the alternative is a complete loss of its tax-exempt status. 
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removed. Congress should remedy the inequities resulting from 
the introduction of the share draft system and should not by 
default shift its policymaking responsibility to the courts. 
Kent H. Collins 
